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Abstract
We analyse the eﬀects of wage uncertainty on the labour supply of self-
employed workers, using PSID data on self-employed American males. The
standard deviation of past wages, as a measure of wage uncertainty, is the key
determinant of male self-employed labour supply, with a signiﬁcant positive
eﬀect. In contrast there is no eﬀect from the (instrumented) wage or other
explanatory variables. Our ﬁndings are consistent with the self-employed ‘self-
insuring’ in response to greater uncertainty by working longer hours, and they
can also help explain why self-employed Americans work longer average hours
for lower average wages than their employee counterparts.
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11 Introduction
The self-employed account for around 10 per cent of the workforce in most developed
countries, employ a similar number of additional workers, and run most of these na-
tions’ ﬁrms (Parker, 2004). Despite this, relatively little is known about the labour
supply of self-employed workers. In contrast, there is an extensive and growing litera-
ture on the labour supply of employees (Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). If for no other
reason, the burgeoning policy interest centring on the promotion of entrepreneurship
and labour market ﬂexibility (with which the self-employed are often associated)
makes it timely to explore more closely what factors bear on the labour input of this
important group of workers.
Although pronounced, the literature’s neglect of self-employed labour supply has
not been complete. Early work by Wales (1973) estimated a simple static model of
work hours using a sample of American self-employed proprietors. More recently,
researchers have explored the labour supply behaviour of speciﬁc self-employed oc-
cupations, including dentists (Boulier, 1979; Scheﬀer and Rossiter, 1983), physicians
(Thornton, 1998), and taxi-drivers (Camerer et al, 1997). We depart from these
studies by focusing on a factor that we argue is a particularly salient one for the
self-employed: income risk. There is now clear evidence that self-employed workers
have more variable and unequal incomes than employees do (Carrington et al, 1996;
Parker, 1997). A separate body of evidence also shows that self-employed workers
face a greater hazard of involuntary exit from their occupation (Evans and Leighton,
1989; Phillips and Kirchhoﬀ, 1989; Taylor, 1999). That is a distinct form of risk that
we do not focus on this paper. Instead, we focus speciﬁcally on uncertainty of returns
within self-employment, as measured by the standard deviation of past wages, and
ask how this aﬀects the labour supply of self-employed workers.
After providing a theoretical discussion of the issues, we conduct an empirical
analysis using a sample of PSID data on self-employed American working-age males.
We exploit the panel nature of the PSID to construct our measure of wage uncertainty.
We ﬁnd this variable to be the key inﬂuence explaining male self-employed labour
supply, with a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect. In contrast we ﬁnd no eﬀect from the
(instrumented) current-period wage, once wage uncertainty is controlled for.
A positive eﬀect of wage uncertainty on self-employed labour supply can poten-
tially resolve a long-standing puzzle of why self-employed Americans work longer
average hours for lower average wages than their employee counterparts do (Aronson,
1991; Carrington et al, 1996; Hamilton, 2000). With free occupational choice, it is
unclear why this state of aﬀairs should persist. Even if the self-employed accepted
lower wages in return for a compensating diﬀerential such as love of independence,
this could only explain lower wages, not longer work hours in self-employment. An al-
2ternative explanation, that the self-employed have some kind of indivisibility in their
production function, is also unsatisfactory, because it begs the question about what
the indivisibility could be and why alternative technologies are not used instead.1
And it does not seem convincing to argue that employees and the self-employed have
substantially diﬀerent tastes for leisure, or are located on diﬀerent sections of a com-
mon labour supply schedule. Employees would need to be located on a backward
bending section of a labour supply schedule in order for a wage premium to be associ-
ated with shorter working hours than the self-employed. But recent research ﬁndings
cast doubt on the relevance of a backward bend in employee labour supply (Blundell
and MaCurdy, 1999, Table 1).
Instead, we propose an alternative explanation based on a ‘self-insurance’ argu-
ment. If the self-employed respond to greater earnings uncertainty by working harder
to make the deterministic part of their incomes larger, they might end up working
longer hours than employees do, despite facing a lower hourly wage. And the exis-
tence of a valuable compensating diﬀerential in self-employment could be suﬃcient
to establish this as an occupational equilibrium.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a theo-
retical analysis of the relationship between wage uncertainty and labour supply, and
derives the conditions under which self-insurance can explain the above labour supply
puzzle. Section 3 discusses empirical issues in estimating the relationship economet-
rically. Section 4 brieﬂy describes the characteristics of our data sample. Section 5
presents the empirical results, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical considerations
Consider a set of identical self-employed individuals who work alone, and earn income
y = g(wL
∗ + B;θ), (1)
where w is the hourly wage, L∗ is the chosen number of hours worked (derived below),
B is investment income, and θ is a random variable capturing uncertainty. The
function g(·) can take several diﬀerent forms, depending on whether the random
shocks θ aﬀect returns additively or multiplicatively, as we discuss below. Note that
the wage w in (1) above might not be exogenous, but possibly depends on L∗, an
1The ‘wage’ of self-employees (and also of employees, in some data sets) is usually computed by
dividing a measure of total income or proﬁt by work hours (see, e.g., Hamilton, 2000). It might be
thought that this automatically yields a negative relationship between the wage and work hours.
However, quite apart from the fact that this argument does not bear on the employee-self-employed
comparison, it is not generally correct, because it assumes that there is a ﬁxed proﬁt available in
self-employment – a particular type of indivisibility.
3issue we will return to later.
Suppose θ is distributed according to F(θ) and has a zero mean: i.e.,
Z +∞
−∞




Assume further that all draws from the random variable are independent and iden-
tically distributed (i.i.d.). This assumption represents the idea of an idiosyncratic
shock that aﬀects incomes in such a way that all risk-averse people would prefer to be
fairly insured against such ﬂuctuations. It is assumed for simplicity that while ﬁrms
can oﬀer insurance against these ﬂuctuations to every employee (as in, e.g., Schaﬀner,
1993), the self-employed are unable to purchase actuarially fair insurance. For ex-
ample, this might be because moral hazard problems are too severe to enable such a
market to exist, or because few self-employed people run enterprises with suﬃciently
high turnover to diversify their risks through a stock market (Kihlstrom and Laﬀont,
1983).
For simplicity, utility is assumed to be both concave and separable. Separability
merely facilitates easy exposition of the key results; we will signpost relaxations of
this assumption below. Let E denote expected value, V variance, and C covariance.





where u0(·) > 0, u00(·) < 0, v0(·) < 0, v00(·) < 0, and all of these functions are
continuous with well behaved second and third derivatives.
To derive our results on self-employed labour supply, we propose a simple model
of self-employment income generation that leads to two diﬀerent speciﬁcations of
(1). Reﬂecting common practice, the self-employed wage w is deﬁned as the ratio
of earnings, E, to work hours, L. But net reported self-employed earnings typically
contain not only the direct return to labour – as is the case for employees – but also
an autonomous component, such as high inventory sales in times of high demand (on
the positive side) and lump-sum business operating costs (on the negative side). Thus
we write E = E0 +αL, where α > 0 is the marginal product of labour and where E0
is autonomous. Not only is this speciﬁcation an arguably realistic representation of
income for the self-employed, but also it has the advantage of presenting a convenient
form within which to analyse two diﬀerent kinds of stochastic shocks: additive and
multiplicative. These are analysed in the next two subsections. At the end of each,
we shall consider the extent to which risk bears on the labour supply puzzle identiﬁed
in the Introduction.
42.1 Additive shocks
We ﬁrst consider the case where E0 is random (with mean E0) but α is ﬁxed, i.e.,
g(wL
∗ + B;θ) = (E0 + θ) + αL
∗ + B . (2)
Hence in this speciﬁcation the computed wage is risky in the sense that w = α+(E0+
θ)/L∗ is stochastic; while (2) shows that shocks aﬀect incomes additively. This case
might arise, for example, if demand shocks determine how much inventory is sold in




yielding the labour supply function L∗ = L∗(α,B), which is assumed to be non-
decreasing in α.
Using the results of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971), a mean preserving spread
(MPS) in θ increases or decreases L∗ as A(θ) := αu0(·)+v0(·) is convex or concave in




The right hand side of (3) is positive if u000(·) > 0, in which case A(θ) is convex,
and labour supply increases with the level of uncertainty. As Arrow (1971) and
others (e.g., Kraus and Litzenberger, 1976) have maintained, u000(·) > 0 is a property
possessed by reasonable utility functions, including those exhibiting nonincreasing
absolute risk aversion. Hence this ‘usual’ case has the self-employed ‘self-insuring’ in
response to greater uncertainty, choosing a larger labour supply and thereby making
the deterministic part of their income relatively larger.2
The interest of this result is underscored by the fact that it can potentially resolve
the labour supply puzzle. Suppose there is free occupational choice between self-
employment and paid employment, the latter denoted by PE superscripts; that there
is a non-pecuniary compensating diﬀerential in self-employment, whose utility value
is given by φ; and that, for simplicity, there is no uncertainty in paid employment.3
In equilibrium, the paid employment wage wPE adjusts to ensure that all individuals
2If utility is quadratic, u000(·) = 0. Then self-employed labour supply is invariant to the level
of risk. If utility is non-separable, then convexity of A(θ) also requires that the third cross-partial
∂3u/[∂L∗(∂y)2] is positive.
3The assumption of no wage uncertainty in paid employment is invoked only for expositional
ease. The argument still goes through if there is uncertainty in paid employment, as long as there
is greater uncertainty in self-employment.
5are indiﬀerent between the two occupations:
u(w
PEL
∗PE + B) + v(L
∗PE) = E[u(E0 + θ + αL
∗ + B] + v(L
∗) + φ, (4)
where L∗PE is optimal labour supply in paid employment, derived by diﬀerentiating
the LHS of (4) and setting to zero. The stylised facts (Aronson, 1991; Carrington
et al, 1996; Hamilton, 2000) are that (i) L∗ > L∗PE and (ii) wPE > w. This jointly
implies that, for (4) to hold, we must have φ > 0. Then as we saw above, the (greater)
wage uncertainty in self-employment can explain the greater labour supply of the self-
employed despite labour supply schedules being non-downward sloping in own wage
and the average self-employed wage being less than that of employees. That is, it
is generally possible to ﬁnd a φ value such that (4) holds at the same time as both
w < wPE and L∗ > L∗PE.
2.2 Multiplicative shocks
Next we consider the case where E0 is ﬁxed but the marginal product of labour is
random (with mean α), i.e.,
g(wL
∗ + B;θ) = E0 + (α + θ)L
∗ + B . (5)
Hence in this speciﬁcation the wage is risky in the sense that w = (α + θ) + (E0/L∗)
is stochastic; while (5) shows that shocks aﬀect incomes multiplicatively. This case
might arise, for example, if shocks aﬀect output prices. The ﬁrst order condition for
self-employed labour supply becomes
E[(α + θ)u
0(·)] + v
0(·) = 0. (6)
From this it is possible to derive optimal labour supply L∗ = L∗(α,B), which is
assumed to be non-decreasing in α as before.
The comparative statics are somewhat more involved than for the additive case.








Unlike (3), the sign of this derivative cannot be determined even if additional restric-
tions are imposed on u(·). The reason is that θ appears in the second term of (7),
which is positive in some states and negative in others. Hence we cannot obtain clear
predictions about how self-employed labour supply responds to a MPS in θ.
What if we utilise a less general deﬁnition of increased uncertainty than the MPS?
6For example, deﬁne a new shock ˜ θ = λθ. Starting from λ = 1 (where θ = ˜ θ) an
increase in λ is a Sandmo increase in risk. Substitute ˜ θ for θ with λ = 1 in the ﬁrst
order condition (6) and partially diﬀerentiate with respect to λ to obtain























since E(θ) = 0. The ﬁrst term on the RHS of (9) is negative because a larger θ
implies a larger y and hence a smaller u0(·). The ﬁrst term of (8) is also negative by
u00(·) < 0. But the second term of (9) is positive if u000(·) > 0, as argued earlier, and
is only negative if u000(·) > 0. Hence it is only possible to sign the eﬀect of greater
uncertainty on labour supply (i.e., as negative) in the ‘unrealistic’ case of increasing
absolute risk aversion. But even here, the prediction of lower labour supply in re-
sponse to greater multiplicative wage uncertainty cannot resolve the labour supply
puzzle outlined earlier. And in the more realistic case of non-increasing absolute risk
aversion, the above analysis shows that even a Sandmo increase in risk cannot yield
any clear-cut results.
The inconclusive nature of this analysis is, not surprisingly, mirrored by previ-
ous studies that have analysed similar problems using non-separable utility func-
tions.4 For example, Block and Heineke (1973) utilised a Slutsky decomposition,
and Hartwick (2000) conducted a numerical simulation exercise using a CES utility
function. In neither case were unambiguous results discovered, except for a particu-
lar special case considered by Hartwick (2000), where stochastic wage outcomes are
clustered closely together and individuals’ elasticities of substitution are greater than
unity. Then a MPS in θ results in greater labour supply, as in the case of additive
shocks.
What we have shown is that even in the special case of separable utility, it is
diﬃcult to obtain any clear prediction about the eﬀects of greater multiplicative wage
uncertainty on self-employed labour supply. It seems that the interaction between the
stochastic shock and the choice variable is what complicates the multiplicative case
relative to the additive one. These theoretical results highlight the value of bringing
data to bear on the problem, in order to resolve the matter empirically.
4If our utility function was non-separable, then (8) has an extra term αL∗E(θ∂2u/∂y∂L∗), whose
sign is state-dependent. No clear-cut result is possible here, even if restrictions are imposed on the
third derivative of the utility function.
72.3 An encompassing speciﬁcation
In empirical applications, it is hard to identify shocks as being either speciﬁcally addi-
tive or multiplicative. Indeed, it seems likely that both kinds of shock might impinge
on earnings simultaneously, for example if output price shocks are positively corre-
lated with shocks to exogenous earnings. And in practice, not only are the sources
of income variation typically unobserved, but so also are the shocks themselves. This
raises questions about the speciﬁcation and instrumentation of self-employment wage
uncertainty in a labour-supply regression.
Based on the foregoing analysis, a natural candidate for an encompassing income
speciﬁcation is
g(wL
∗ + B;θ) = E0 + ξθ + (α + θ)L
∗ + B ,
where ξ > 0 gives the weight of additive relative to multiplicative shocks. This spec-
iﬁcation provides a plausible and reasonably general basis for our empirical investi-
gation. We will ﬁnd it convenient in our investigation to use the standard deviation
of past wages as an instrument for uncertainty. This incorporates both additive and
multiplicative shocks, as we now show.
Suppose we have sample data for individuals i at time t. If we also allow for the
(realistic) possibility that reported self-employed labour earnings are measured with
error, it [where E(it) = 0], then the self-employed wage of i at t is computed as
follows:
ˆ wit :=




= αit + θit +




Hence although E(ˆ wit) = αit + (E0it/L∗
it) since E(θit) = 0, we have C(ˆ wit,L∗
it) < 0,
causing a negative bias if a labour supply equation L∗ is estimated as a function of ˆ wit
by least squares.5 This requires ˆ wit to be instrumented. We discuss an appropriate
choice of instruments in the next section.
3 Empirical speciﬁcation
Let Li be the observed number of hours supplied by a self-employed individual i;
let wi be their computed hourly wage (which, as this is a self-employed sample, we
will discuss shortly); and let ri be the standard deviation of i’s past log wages – our
measure of wage uncertainty, as noted above. Also, let µi denote i’s unearned income,
5This is a (generalised) counterpart of the phenomenon of ‘division bias’ in the labour supply
literature: see, e.g., Rogerson and Rupert (1993).
8and let Xi denote a vector of personal and job-speciﬁc characteristics (including a
column of ones). Consider the following simple labour supply speciﬁcation:
lnLi = αlnwi + β lnµi + γri + X
0
iδ + Υi + ζi , (10)
where α, β are γ are scalars, δ is a k-dimensional vector of coeﬃcients, Υi are individ-
ual ﬁxed eﬀects, and ζi is a disturbance assumed to be normally and independently
distributed, with mean zero and variance σ2
ζ.
Several special problems attend the estimation of (10) using sample data on self-
employed survey respondents. First, as noted in the previous section, lnwi is likely
to be endogenous, and so should be instrumented. (A Hausman-Wu test did indeed
indicate endogeneity in our empirical application – see Section 5 below.) Second,
ri can only be meaningfully computed for those self-employed individuals who have
been observed for a suﬃcient number of consecutive periods. Consequently there is
possible selection bias if these individuals have diﬀerent characteristics from the rest
of the sample. Third, there is also likely to be sampling error in the measurement of
ri, giving rise to a systematic structure in the variance-covariance matrix of the error
term. We now take each of these points in turn.
There are several ways of instrumenting lnwi. One is to propose a set of instru-
ments drawn from the same period in which the wage is observed. The problem with
this approach, which is necessary if only cross-section data are available, is that it
requires more or less ad hoc exclusion restrictions on the set of instruments and the
set of regressors, X. In contrast, the availability of panel data enables the researcher
to side step this problem by using previous period log wages as instruments. These
can be expected to satisfy the usual criteria for valid instruments, namely correlation
with lnwi but independence from ζi. We will adopt this approach below and test the
quality of these instruments.
The second consideration is the sample frame. Because ri is measured as the stan-
dard deviation of wages observed in each of ni previous periods – where ni can vary
from individual to individual – at least two previous observations on each i’s earn-
ings are needed to compute ri. Hence no individual with less than three consecutive
wage observations (one current and two previous) can be included in the sample.6
This raises the possibility of having an unrepresentative, self-selected sample. We
will check this in two ways below, both by comparing the sample characteristics of
included and excluded respondents, and by incorporating a selectivity correction into
the empirical model.
6The stipulation that these observations are consecutive is an important one, because the concept
of speciﬁcally self-employment wage uncertainty for an individual who mixes self-employment with
employment spells does not make obvious sense. We leave the more complicated problem of wage
uncertainty deﬁned over mixed spells for future work.
9The problem of heteroscedasticity arises because sample values of wage uncer-
tainty, denoted by ˜ ri, diﬀer systematically from population values denoted by ri.
Assume that the diﬀerence is given by a mean-zero normally distributed error, νi.
This error recognises that we possess only a (stochastic) sample estimate of non-
stochastic ri, rather than the population value based on the entire (but unobserved)
set of wages. That is, ˜ ri = ri + νi, with E(˜ ri) = ri, i.e., ˜ ri is an unbiased estimator of
ri. Then the empirical counterpart to (10) is
lnLi = αlnwi + β lnµi + γri + X
0
iδ + Υi + (ζi + γνi). (11)
Deﬁne Ξi := ζi + γνi. Clearly E(Ξi) = 0 and V(Ξi) = σ2
ζ + γ2V(νi). It can be shown
using standard results from intermediate statistics (e.g., Wetherill, 1981, Sec. 1.5)
that
V(νi) = V(˜ ri) = 2r
4
i/(ni − 1).
Hence it follows that the variance of the disturbance term of (11) can be consistently
estimated as
ςi := \ V(Ξi) = ˆ σ
2
ζ +
2ˆ γ2 ˆ ˜i r4
ni − 1
. (12)
This expression implies that the longer an individual’s wages have been observed (i.e.,
the greater is ni), the more precise the estimated variance of those wages, as expected.
The above arguments suggest that, after instrumenting the log wage to get lnwI
i,
a two-stage feasible GLS estimator can be used to estimate the key parameters of
























where zi are the columns of Zi := [lnwI
i, lnµi, ri, Xi]. The ﬁrst step is to estimate
the parameters of (11), and the second is to use the results to compute the ςi and so
estimate Θ from (13). It is well known that this is a consistent estimator, and that it-
erating the above procedure does not improve on it and is generally not recommended
in practice (Greene, 2002, Sec. 11.6).
104 Data sample
The data for this study are collected from the Panel Study of Income Dynam-
ics (PSID), using a panel of 26 waves of cleaned observations, from 1968 to 1993.
Our sample comprises self-employed male working-age household heads. The self-
employed were deﬁned as individuals who were working at the time of the interview;
who were self-employed in their main job; and who were not also working for some-
one else contemporaneously. The sample was restricted to self-employed individuals
who earned positive incomes and worked positive numbers of hours (but no greater
than 4000 annually), who had at least three consecutive years of income data, and
single continuous spells in self-employment (the latter to avoid contaminating esti-
mates of the eﬀects of risk with occupational switching). This left a sample of 1456
observations on 286 self-employed individuals.
The average annual work hours in the sample was 2,555. This is comparable
with those reported in other studies, e.g., Carrington et al (1996), whose sample
average over a similar period was 2,396. Hourly wages were computed by dividing
annual earned income by annual hours worked. Both earned and unearned incomes
were deﬂated to 1975 dollars using the CPI. The average hourly wage rate was about
$6.46, which is similar to the rate reported by Hamilton (2000), calculated from 1980s
Survey of Income and Program Participation data.7 The variable lnwi was deﬁned
as the natural logarithm of one plus the hourly wage. The variable lnµi was deﬁned
as the natural logarithm of one plus the respondent’s investment income plus wife’s
income, if any. The variable ri was calculated as the natural logarithm of the standard
deviation of wages in the immediately preceding contiguous years.
Data were also collected for several explanatory variables, X. These included the
number of years in the present job (‘tenure’), a dummy for (self-assessed) disability
status, age and its square, and the number of children in the household. Summary
statistics are collected in Table 1. The average age of sample respondents is a little
over 46 years, which partly accounts for the relatively small average number of children
in the household, and the relatively long average tenure in the job, of just under 14
years.
As a preliminary check for possible selection bias, we re-computed Table 1 for
all self-employed individuals with positive incomes and work hours. The summary
statistics are reported in Table A1, in the Appendix. These statistics reveal that the
only major diﬀerence compared with Table 1 is the average tenure being over 5 years
7In contrast, Carrington et al (1996) used a diﬀerent sample frame, which also included respon-
dents with employment income. This might partly account for the higher average wage rates reported
in that study compared to ours. We also tried adjusting the data for topcoding, by multiplying max-
imum labour incomes by 1.33 as in Devereux (2003), but this made an imperceptible diﬀerence to
the results.
11Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable names Description Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum
LHOURS Log of annual 7.78 0.43 2.48 8.29
work hours
WAGE Log of real wage 1.60 0.65 0.01 7.55
RISK Std.Dev. of log 0.21 0.43 0.00 6.25
past wages
UNINC Log of real 6.57 3.81 0.00 11.53
unearned income
TENURE No. years in the 13.85 9.77 0.08 50.00
current job
DISAB Dummy variable 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
= 1 if disabled
AGE Age 46.60 10.80 21.00 65.00
AGE2 AGE squared/100 22.89 9.92 4.41 42.25
NCHILD No. of children 1.18 1.28 0.00 7.00
in the household
Source: PSID, 1968–93, authors’ calculations. Maximum number of observations: 1456.
Minimum number of observations: 1379.
longer in the latter. This is of course just as we would expect, reﬂecting our need
to focus on longer self-employment spells. In all other respects, the characteristics of
the narrower sample are fairly similar to those of the broader sample. Hence we do
not have strong a priori grounds for believing that selection bias will be a problem.
5 Results
We ﬁrst tested whether the computed wage is endogenous. A Hausman-Wu statistic
of χ2(1) = 4.20 indicated that it is. As explained in Section 3, we instrumented the
wage using the previous two years’ wages, together with individual ﬁxed eﬀects. An
F statistic of F(2,1156) = 11.727 conﬁrms the quality of these instruments.
We ﬁrst estimated a model of labour supply without the risk variable, termed
model (1). We then re-estimated the model including the risk variable, to gauge
directly the eﬀect of omitting it. This is termed model (2). The results are collected
in Table 2.
The results for model (1) suggest that the wage rate is a key explanatory variable,
with a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect. This is indicative of a backward bending labour
supply schedule, and mirrors the ﬁndings of other authors for self-employed workers.8
8E.g., Wales (1973) found evidence of backward-bending labour supply behaviour by American
12Table 2: Estimates of the self-employed labour supply model
Variable Model (1) Model (2)
















No. Obs. 1379 1379
R2 0.80 0.80
F(k,n − k) 15.35∗∗ 59.00∗∗
Source: Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the annual hours of work. Results
include individual ﬁxed eﬀects (not reported). The estimator is two-stage feasible GLS,
with an instrumented wage. Instruments are two period lagged wages. Standard errors are
in parentheses. ∗ p-value less than 0.05; ∗∗p-value less than 0.01.
13The only other signiﬁcant variable is the square of age, which also has a signiﬁcant
negative eﬀect. This implies that self-employed individuals adjust their work hours
downwards as they age, with older workers adjusting them more than their younger
counterparts do. Evidence of this kind of behaviour is quite well established in work
on partial retirement by the self-employed (see, e.g., Fuchs, 1982; Honig and Hanoch,
1985).
The results for model (2) question the robustness of these results. When the risk
variable is included, the signiﬁcant eﬀects from the wage rate disappear. The eﬀect
from squared age is a little smaller and no longer signiﬁcant at a 5 per cent signiﬁcance
level (though it is signiﬁcant at the 10 per cent level). In contrast, risk exerts a
signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on work hours. It is also the only signiﬁcant determinant of
self-employed work hours. In line with our earlier theoretical analysis, this ﬁnding is
consistent with the self-employed self-insuring to compensate for greater risk. While
it is unclear whether this reﬂects a dominant role for additive relative to multiplicative
risk, it does have two important implications. First, risk appears to be the key to
understanding self-employed labour supply. And second, the positive eﬀect on labour
supply can in principle explain the self-employed labour supply puzzle outlined in the
Introduction (see Section 2.1).
One might ask why the inclusion of risk in the labour-supply speciﬁcation ren-
ders the wage rate insigniﬁcant. One answer might be along standard econometric
lines: that the exclusion of a relevant variable biases the coeﬃcients (and standard
errors) of all other variables in the regression (Greene, 2002). Thus, the apparent
ﬁnding (in model (1) and in the previous self-employed labour supply studies cited
in footnote 8) of a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect from the wage rate might be spurious.
While possibly appealing, this answer does however beg the question as to why the
estimated coeﬃcient on the instrumented wage becomes closer to zero, rather than
diverging from zero, when r is included. We cannot readily suggest any reasons based
on the theoretical analysis as to why this might be so. But we can probably rule out
an explanation based on multicollinearity between the instrumented wage and the
standard deviation of past wages. Collinearity does not bias regression coeﬃcients
so cannot explain the diﬀerences in the estimated coeﬃcient on the instrumented
wage in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2. While collinearity does increase estimated
standard errors, Table 2 oﬀers little evidence that this has occurred either; and the
partial correlation coeﬃcient between r and lnwI is only 0.113 in any case.
We went on to conduct two robustness checks on the empirical results. In the
ﬁrst, we measured r as the variance (rather than the standard deviation) of previous
self-employed proprietors using NBER-Thorndike data. Camerer et al (1997) also reported negative
eﬀects from wage rates on the labour supply of self-employed New York taxi-drivers. They took this
as evidence that taxicab drivers ‘take one day at a time’.
14log wages. The results were virtually unchanged from those of column (2), with a γ
estimate of 0.124 (standard error = 0.053). Hence we conclude that the results are
robust to a diﬀerent functional form of the risk variable.
A second issue that needs to be addressed is that of sample selection. In this
instance, as we have already mentioned, the possible sample selection is that those self
employed individuals with the 3 or more years of observed self-employment incomes
necessary to compute our risk measure are a non random selection from the wider
sample of self-employed. As we have already noted, a comparison of Table 1 with
Table A.1 indicates that the two samples are similar. However, to check this further
we added to the estimated hours equation a Heckman correction term evaluated at the
estimates obtained from a ﬁxed eﬀects probit with dependent variable equalling one
for self employed individuals with 3 or more years observed self employed income, and
zero with 2 or less. This probit contains full year dummies and is reported as Table A.2
in the Appendix. The coeﬃcient on the included selection term was insigniﬁcant with
value 0.016 and standard error of 0.043. We conclude that while the self-employed
themselves may be a self-selected sample, those remaining self-employed for 3 or more
consecutive periods does not involve a further selection on characteristics, and so we
can base inference regarding the determinants of self employed labour supply with
some conﬁdence on this sample.
6 Conclusion
This paper presented a new approach to thinking about the labour supply behaviour
of self-employed individuals. We developed a theoretical model that explores the dif-
ferent ways that wage uncertainty might aﬀect self-employed labour supply. An em-
pirical investigation based on PSID data suggested that risk, proxied by the standard
deviation of past log wages, is the sole determinant of self-employed labour supply,
and its inclusion in a self-employed labour supply regression model rather strikingly
rendered the previously signiﬁcant wage insigniﬁcant. In addition, these results might
also supply an answer to the long-standing puzzle of why the self-employed work such
long hours for relatively low wages. Of course, these ﬁndings have only been derived
from one data set, and further work using other data is needed. But they do suggest
that further work on the topic of labour supply under wage uncertainty generally,
and of self-employed labour supply in particular, might usefully clarify and extend
our knowledge about these important topics.
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17Appendix
Table A1. Summary statistics for all self-employed workers
Variable names Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum
LHOURS 7.63 1.80 1.00 8.29
WAGE 1.60 0.77 0.01 7.56
UNINC 5.95 3.74 0.00 11.53
TENURE 8.42 8.83 0.08 60.67
DISAB 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00
AGE 41.89 11.15 18.00 65.00
AGE2 18.79 9.68 3.24 42.25
NCHILD 1.26 1.37 0.00 10.00
Source: PSID, 1968–93, authors’ calculations. Maximum number of observations: 10319.
Minimum number of observations: 9531.
















Source: Dependent variable is one if the individual was self-employed for three or more
years consecutively, and zero if self-employed for two consecutive years or less. YRSED is
years of education; EDTEN is the interaction of YRSED and TENURE. Results include
individual ﬁxed eﬀects and time dummies (not reported). Standard errors are in
parentheses. For asterisks, see Table 1.
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